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Résumé 
 
Après deux décennies de leadership des États-Unis dans les années 1980 et 1990, les marchés 
européens de capital-risque ont-ils comblé une partie de leur retard en termes de nombre de 
financements accord￩s et d‟issues r￩ussies de ces financements, ou l'￩cart est-il plus grand que 
jamais? Peut-on voir des nouvelles encourageantes dans la situation globalement sinistrée que 
traverse actuellement le capital-risque ? Nous nous efforçons de répondre à ces questions, en 
suivant  un  échantillon  de  plus  de  40.000  entreprises  financées  par  capital-risque  pour  six 
industries et dans 13 pays europ￩ens ainsi qu‟aux Etats-Unis. En particulier, nous déterminons 
quel type de sortie du fond – lorsqu‟elle a eu lieu - les investisseurs ont choisi pour chaque 
entreprise sur la période 1985-2009. Nos résultats empiriques suggèrent que: (i) les investisseurs 
européens ont réduit leur retard en termes de nombre d'entreprises soutenues par les capital-
risqueurs qui sont finalement introduit publiquement en bourse, quoique ceci aille de pair avec 
une dégradation globale du nombre d‟entr￩es en bourse ; (ii) l'Europe reste derri￨re les États-Unis 
en ce qui concerne les fusions et acquisitions ainsi que pour sorties de fonds réussies des startups, 
(iii) le montant moyen investi ainsi que les dépenses de recherche & développement sont des 
déterminants importants de la réussite du capital-risque, mais ils ont un impact positif seulement 
après 2000, et (iv) les différences idiosyncrasiques entre industries semblent être plus pertinentes 
que  les  caractéristiques  spécifiques  à  chaque  pays  pour  expliquer  les  différences  dans  la 
performance. 
 
Mots-clés:  capital-risque;  capital  d‟investissement  (private  equity);  taux  de  réussite; 
performance; introduction publique en bourse 
 




After nearly two decades of U.S. leadership in the 1980s and 1990s, are Europe‟s venture capital 
markets in the 2000s finally catching up regarding the provision of financing and successful exits, 
or is the performance gap as wide as ever? Are we amidst overall dismal performance of the 
venture capital experience without any encouraging news? We attempt to answer these questions 
by tracking down over 40,000 venture capital--backed firms of six industries in 13 European 
countries  and  the  U.S.,  and  determine  which  type  of  exit  –  if  any  –  each  particular  firm‟s 
investors have chosen between 1985 and 2009. Our empirical findings suggest that: (i) in terms of 
the  number  of  venture  capital-backed  firms  successfully  going  public,  European  venture 
capitalists have closed the gap with respect to the U.S., albeit as a result of a worse initial public 
offering performance overall; (ii) Europe continues to lag behind the U.S. by means of mergers 
and  acquisitions,  and  in  successful  exits  of  seed/start-up  and  early  stage  firms,  (iii)  average 
investment  and  R&D  are  important  determinants  of  venture  capital  success,  but  only have  a 
positive impact after 2000; and (iv) idiosyncratic differences across industries seem to be more 
relevant than country-specific characteristics in explaining differences in performance. 
 
Keywords: Venture capital; private equity; success rates; performance; IPOs 
 
JEL Classification Codes: G24, G3    
I  Introduction 
 
Entrepreneurship,  innovation,  and  venture  capital  (VC)  are  pivotal  to  success  in 
economic  development,  as  they  provide  for  wealth  creation  and  a  rising  standard  of 
living.  Over  the  past  decade,  extensive  research  has  been  done  to  compare  the 
performance of VC financing in European Union (EU) countries to those in the U.S. 
(Black and Gilson, 1998; Bottazi and Da Rin, 2002; Da Rin, Nicodano and Sembenelli, 
2006;  Aussenegg  and  Jelic,  2007;  Hege,  Palomino  and  Schwienbacher,  2009). 
Differences  in  stock  market  development,  contract  and  tax  legislation,  labor  market 
regulations,  and  entrepreneurial  spirit,  have  been  often  cited  in  connection  to  the 
consistent  underperformance  of  European  VC  investments  relative  to  their  American 
counterparts. Even as recently as the pre-crisis period of 2005-2007, there have been no 
signs  of  a  decrease  in  the  performance  gap  between  European  and  Americian  VC 
investments (Raade and Dantas Machado, 2008). 
Although VC financing has experienced rapid growth over the last two decades 
(Aizenman and Kendall, 2008; Kraeussl and Wuebker, 2011), the literature is still lacking 
a comprehensive analysis of whether this performance gap is not solely explained by a 
“Europe is lagging behind” argument, but may also be attributable to industry-specific 
and/or financing stage specific characteristics. Therefore, the objective of our study is to 
determine whether VC-backed companies active in specific industries across countries 
and within countries are more likely to become profitable so that venture capitalists can 
exit successfully.  
A typical VC fund is liquidated after one decade. Consequently, if a VC-backed 
portfolio company does not have sufficient potential to be exited before the end of a 
decade, a venture capitalist is unlikely to invest in the company. Successful exits are 
critical to  these  investors  to  ensure  attractive  returns  and,  in  turn,  to  raise  additional 
capital. However, interest in certain industries by public investors is susceptible to change 
and,  as  such,  it  is  not  equally  easy  to  exit  investments  of  all  types  at  all  times 
(Maksimovic and Pichler, 2001). For example, in recent years, „hot issue markets‟ like 
Computer Hardware, Biotechnology, Multimedia, and Internet companies have appeared 
and disappeared. Concerns about the ability to exit investments may have led to too many    
private  equity  transactions  being  undertaken  in  these  „hot‟  industries  (Gompers  and 
Lerner,  2000;  Lerner,  2002).  On  the  flip  side,  industries  that  are  not  in  the  public 
spotlight may have received only insufficient funds. This causes an imbalance in the 
distribution of VC across different industries. 
We explore whether venture capitalists in certain industries are more likely to exit 
their investments via initial public offerings (IPOs), sales, or by means of leveraged buy-
outs (LBOs). To this end, we examine VC investments and exits in the U.S. and 13 EU 
countries  over  the  period  1985-2009,  while  further  classifying  firms  into  six  distinct 
industries. The wide dimensionality of our data set (whose characteristics we describe in 
detail in Section II) allows us to uncover significant relationships and common factors 
that lead to VC-backed firms completing the exit phase. We also seek to understand the 
institutional features and the legal environment associated with successful VC financing 
in the U.S. and in Europe.  
Another  relevant  issue  that  we  address  in  this  paper  is  the  asymmetry  in 
performance between VC-backed firms at different investment stages (i.e., seed/start-up 
and early stage firms versus mature firms) and its effect on the performance gap. As 
shown by Jeng and Wells (2000), early and later stage venture investments are affected 
quite differently by the determinants of VC. Hence, we intend to find out whether the 
weak performance of European early stage venture investments relative to the U.S., as 
documented  by  Raade  and  Dantas  Machado  (2008),  is  more  prevalent  in  certain 
industries. 
To  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  our  paper  provides  the  first  comprehensive 
comparative  analysis  between  the  success  of  European  and  American  VC-backed 
portfolio companies. This allows us to uncover relationships and common factors that 
lead  to  a  successful  exit  of  VC-backed  portfolio  companies  and,  as  a  result,  strong 
performance by VC funds. We control for industry-specific factors, investment stage, 
macroeconomic conditions, and the legal environment in the European countries and the 
U.S.  that  are  known  to  affect  the  exiting  environment.  First,  we  explore  for  which 
industries the difference in success between VC-backed companies from 13 EU countries 
and  the  U.S.  are  most  prominent  and  for  which  industries  the  performance  gap  is 
smallest. Subsequently, we try to identify whether perceptible differences exist between    
the successes of VC-backed companies that have received financing at an early stage vis-
à-vis those that have received financing at a later stage. Finally, we break our sample into 
two sub-periods, 1985-1999 and 2000-2009, in order to explicitly analyze whether the 
performance  gap  has  narrowed  (for  specific  industries)  or,  in  other  words,  whether 
Europe has been able to catch up over the last years. 
Our results suggest that, inasmuch as some of the differences in performance can 
be  explained  by  country-specific  factors  (in  particular,  when  considering  early  stage 
companies) there exist significant idiosyncratic differences in success across industries. 
We find that, for instance, venture capitalists invested in companies active in the Biotech 
and  the  Health,  Medical  and  Life  Science  sectors  are  significantly  more  likely  to 
successfully exit these investments via IPOs, while those invested in companies active in 
the Computer industry and in the Communications and Media sector are more likely to 
successfully exit via mergers and acquisitions. Significant differences across industries 
also emerge when considering early stage versus later stage VC-backed companies and 
the preferred method of exit. 
The findings of our sub-period analysis show that during the second sub-period of 
2000-2009 the difference between the success of European and American VC-backed 
companies became smaller and that Europe indeed has been able to catch up. The number 
of European companies that received VC financing is almost at par with their American 
counterparts. Furthermore, successful exits by IPOs have converged as well although 
overall they have shown a worse performance relative to the first sub-period. However, 
with regard to exits by mergers and acquisitions of VC-backed companies the U.S. has 
clearly retained its edge over Europe. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II we provide an 
overview of the data used in this study followed by a description of how we construct the 
different variables associated with VC success rate. Our initial empirical results based on 
a set of summary statistics are discussed in section III while section IV presents the 
results of our regression analyses based on probit models that allow us to identify the 
relative importance of different determinants in the probability of successful exit. Finally, 
section V concludes. 
    
II.  Data and Measures 
 
II.1  Sample 
Our sample covers the period 1985-2009 and includes data on exits of VC-backed firms 
and several determinants for the U.S. and 13 EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and 
the United Kingdom). The remaining two of the original EU-15 countries – Greece and 
Luxembourg – were excluded from the analysis as a result of missing information for 
some variables. From here on out, we will refer to the group of 13 European countries 
that make up our sample as EU-13. 
Data on VC-backed companies stem from VentureXpert, which includes data on 
VC and private equity firms, funds, financing rounds, industry benchmark statistics, and 
more. The variables include company specific information such as nation, date of the first 
round of financing, industry classification, and outcome/exit. Data on country specific 
variables (Gross Domestic Product, Population, and Research and Development figures) 
are obtained from Euromonitor and the SourceOECD database. We control for three legal 
system  variables  in  our  study:  Rule  of  Law  and  Creditor  Rights  originate  from  the 
seminal paper by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997), while a revised 
index for Anti-Director Rights was obtained from Spamann (2010). The use of these 
variables in controlling for performance in financial markets has been motivated by the 
works of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), Cumming, Fleming 
and Schwienbacher (2006), and Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann (2009). 
In total, we have data on the evolution of 41,266 firms that received VC funding 
over the period 1985-2009. This data allows us to determine which investments venture 
capitalists exited – if at all – and how. Table I summarizes the composition of this data 
set; the statistics are presented by country, stage of development of the firm when it 
received its first round of VC financing (seed, start-up and early stage, or mature), and by 
industry. This latter classification is explained in more detail below. As expected, most 
VC-backed companies have their origin in the U.S. (27,583 making up approximately 2/3 
of the entire sample). In contrast, for Portugal and Austria we collected information on 
only 250 and 222 firms, respectively. 
    
<Insert Table I about here> 
 
Given that this paper seeks to determine whether industry-specific factors play a 
significant role in determining the likelihood of a successful venture exit, it would be 
beneficial  to  obtain  as  many  independent  industry-specific  variables  as  possible  that 
match  the  industry  categories  used  by  VentureXpert.  Following  Gompers,  Kovner, 
Lerner and Scharfstein (2008), we group firms into categories that exhibit similarities in 
technology  and  management  expertise.  To  link  the  industry  trend  data  to  the  firms 
obtained  from  VentureXpert  we  matched  ISIC  codes  with  the  VentureXpert  industry 
classifications  as  follows.  We  initially  mapped  out  a  categorization  table  of  the 
VentureXpert industry classification system from its most broad level „Major Group‟ 
down to the most detailed level titled „Sub-category 3‟. Then, by evaluating each line on 
the ISIC category list, we assigned them to their appropriate VentureXpert Sub-category 
3 listing.  The outcome is the classification into six main industry groups: Computer 
Software  and  Hardware;  Semi-conductors  and  Other  Electronics;  Biotechnology; 
Medical,  Health  and  Life  Sciences;  Communications  and  Media;  and  Non-high 
Technology. This allows us to keep the main recipients of VC disbursements (Gompers 
and Lerner, 2001) separated, while allowing for a reasonable level of aggregation in the 
data that will assist us in our empirical analysis.  
Table I also indicates that for both the EU-13 and the U.S non-high tech is the 
sector with most transactions, while the smallest number of VC-backed firms can be 
found in semi-conductors and other electronics, and the biotech industry. Moreover, we 
can see a similar amount of infant firms (infant firms include seed, start-up, and early 
stage companies) as mature firms for the case of the U.S. In sharp contrast, there exists 
roughly a 5-to-2 ratio of mature vis-à-vis infant firms in the case of the EU-13, revealing 
a bias against the provision of early-stage financing in Europe. 
In our empirical analysis, we split our sample into two sub-periods, 1985-1999 
and 2000-2009, which allows us to explicitly investigate whether Europe has been able to 
catch up with the U.S. with respect to successful exits of VC-backed firms. We note that 
it is unlikely that venture capitalists have exited firms that received their initial funding 
(i.e. first financing round) in recent years. Including these companies would likely bias    
our results downward. In order to address this issue, even though we consider exits that 
have occurred up until July 2009, we exclude from the sample companies that have been 
operating for less than 4 years after receiving their final round of venture funding. Hence, 
our sample includes companies that received funding through 2005 and exits that took 
place  through  July  2009.  Other  than  correcting  for  this  potential  downward  bias,  an 
additional advantage of this sample split is that it provides an almost equal distribution of 
transactions across the two periods. We examine 20,283 firms that received VC between 
1985 and 1999, and 20,983 that were VC-backed in or after the year 2000. We provide 
further details as to the composition of the data per sub-period in Section III. 
 
II.2  Measuring Success 
Studies that have analyzed to date historical performance for European and American VC 
investments utilize diverging computation methods for returns and, thus, varying results. 
In particular, issues regarding definitions, investment classification and valuation but also 
self-reporting  and  survivorship  biases  make  these  performance  figures  difficult  to 
compare.  Previous  studies  that  have  dealt  with  how  to  compute  returns  on  VC 
investments include  Cumming  and  MacIntosh (2003), who examine a  sample of 248 
hand-collected VC exits in Canada and the U.S., and Cochrane (2005), who analyzes 
exits using VentureOne data. In order to measure success of an investment, ideally one 
would  require  data  on  the  actual  returns  on  venture  capital  funds‟  investments. 
Unfortunately, this is not possible because neither VentureOne nor VentureXpert, the two 
main databases, collect valuation data on all the companies that are or have been part of a 
VC  fund.  Therefore,  we  proceed  to  measure  success as  a  binary  variable:  whether  a 
venture capitalist has exited an investment; and if so, we also record the exit strategy 
present. 
Following Gompers et al. (2008), our proposed measure of „success‟ takes the 
type of exit of a particular company into consideration. We define Success by IPO (S1) as 
the number of firms that received VC financing, and were exited via IPO. Success by 
Merger  or  Acquisition  (S2)  is  defined  analogously,  this  time  considering  VC-backed 
firms that were either merged with or acquired by other firms. Finally, we introduce a 
measure of Overall Success (OS), which is the sum of S1 and S2.    
We make one further classification, which consists of separating the performance 
of infant firms that received VC financing, from the performance of mature firms. For all 
company data we recorded whether the firm was seed/start-up or early stage at the time it 
received its first VC investment. Success of Infant Firms (IS) is computed as the number 
of seed, start-up, and early stage firms funded by venture capitalists who exited the firm 
by taking it public, or through a merger or acquisition. Similarly,  Success of Mature 
Firms (MS) is computed as the number of mature firms funded by venture capitalists who 
exited the firm through any of the two above-mentioned channels. 
The success variables are constructed by analyzing the final sample of VC-backed 
companies, where the investment domiciles are set equal to the companies‟ nations. The 
success  variables  are  then  ordered  by  country,  by  year,  and  by  industry  to  obtain  a 
success  rate,  which  is  defined  as  the  number  of  VC-backed  companies  that  were 
successfully exited in a given year for a given country divided by the total number of VC-
backed companies for that given year and country. The year specified in this case is set to 
be equal to the year in which the firm received its first round investment. This means, for 
example,  that  the  future  success  of  all  companies  that  received  their  first  round  of 
financing in the year 2000 would be attributed to the year the first investment round was 
received, in this case 2000, irrespective of the year in which they exited.  
 
III  Have European Countries Closed the Performance Gap? 
 
In this section we provide a first answer to the questions as to whether there still exists a 
gap between the success rates of U.S. and European VC-backed portfolio companies; if 
this discrepancy has become more or less pronounced; and whether this can be explained 
by industry and/or investment stage specific characteristics by analyzing a set of sample 
statistics. We will begin by providing a comparison between the success rates by IPO 
(S1) and Merger and Acquisition (S2) of U.S. and European VC-backed companies over 
the two sub-periods. Then, we will explore whether a company‟s investment stage affects 
the likelihood for success. Finally, we will present a comprehensive industry-by-industry 
analysis of success rates across the two regions, exit strategies, investment stages, and    
periods. The insights gained here will form the basis of the subsequent comprehensive 
regression analyses, which we perform in section IV. 
 
III.1  Comparison of Success Rates by Exit Strategy 
We begin by providing a comparison between the performance of the U.S. and European 
countries  over the entire period  of study, comparing  their performances  in  both  sub-
periods. Table II presents a breakdown of success rates of both U.S. and EU-13 VC-
backed companies by exit strategy. 
 
<Insert Table II about here> 
 
As suspected, the table reveals that the sub-period analysis is indeed a story of 
two  tales.  Until  1999,  it  is  clear  that  the  U.S.  dominates  Europe  in  most  relevant 
categories: for every European firm receiving VC financing between 1985 and 1999, 
more than four American firms were financed during that same period. During that same 
span,  while  American  firms  backed  by  VC  were  taken  public  in  22  percent  of  the 
occasions and another 29 percent had been merged with or were acquired by one or more 
other firms, the corresponding numbers for European companies are 15 and 20 percent, 
respectively. This confirms what had been documented in previous studies (Black and 
Gilson, 1998; Murray and Marriott, 1998; Bottazi and Da Rin, 2002). Finally, LBOs were 
particularly prevalent in the case of European firms (over 17 percent), but almost non-
existent when considering American firms (less than 2%). These results are also in line 
with the seminal paper by Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998) and the recent empirical 
findings by Brau and Fawcett (2006) and Bancel and Mittoo (2009) who present in a 
survey of chief financial officers (CFOs) substantial differences regarding the preferred 
exit  strategy.  European  CFOs  favor  maintaining  control  of  the  firm  while  American 
CFOs value the ability of the pre-IPO investors to exit and experience significant changes 
in ownership structure after the IPO. 
Starting from the year 2000, our findings in Table II show that the VC success 
story has been a more balanced one – albeit not quite as successful as between the mid-
1980s and late 1990s. The number of European firms backed by VC is roughly equal to    
that of their American counterparts. The number of exits by IPO has also converged, 
although to a very low level of about six percent for all firms receiving funding; in fact, 
the average success rate for the 13 European countries is slightly higher than that for the 
U.S.  Nevertheless,  this  mostly  reflects  a  “cooling  down”  in  overall  IPO  activity,  as 
documented by Ritter and Welch (2002) and Gompers et al. (2008).  
Regarding  mergers  and  acquisitions  of  VC-backed  firms,  a  slowdown  is  also 
observable, albeit much less dramatic compared to the slowdown in IPO activity. Here, 
the U.S. has clearly retained its edge over Europe: while nearly 22 percent of American 
firms have merged or have been acquired by others, their European counterparts have 
only exhibited a less than 11 percent success rate during the same period. For illustration 
and comparison purposes, we once again report the percentage of exits via LBOs, which 
remained basically unchanged for European countries (16 percent), and slightly increased 
in the case of American firms to 5 percent. This is indicative that exit strategies chosen 
differ substantially between the U.S. and Europe: while  acquisitions and mergers are 
more prevalent in American VC-backed firms, LBOs are a more frequent event for their 
European  counterparts.  We  note  that  since  LBOs  do  not  necessarily  constitute  a 
successful exit, we do not include them when computing overall success for the reminder 
of the analysis. 
 
III.2  Comparison of Success Rates by Investment Stage 
Another decomposition that is worthwhile analyzing is whether the relative maturity of a 
firm receiving VC financing affects its likelihood of success.  Jeng and Wells  (2000) 
describe  how  early  and  later  stage  ventures  are  affected  quite  differently  by  the 
determinants of VC. To assess whether there are differences by areas and periods, Table 
III displays the comparison of VC investments and success rates between the U.S. and 
Europe separating infant and mature firms. 
 
<Insert Table III about here> 
 
During the period between 1985 and 1999, roughly an equal number of mature 
vis-à-vis  infant  firms  were  financed  in  the  U.S.  On  the  contrary,  for  the  average  13    
European countries, mature firms receiving VC funds outnumbered infant firms by a 
larger than 3-to-1 ratio. However, given that the success rate for infant firms was slightly 
higher than that of mature firms for European countries (while it was roughly similar for 
the U.S.), the “survival” or ex-post ratio – i.e. the ratio of successful mature firms to 
infant firms – fell to 2.83 in Europe, while remaining close to par in the case of the U.S. 
The analysis of the second period paints a grim picture for infant firms in Europe: 
even though the ex-ante ratio between mature and infant firms is lower starting in 2000 
(2.32), much of the underperformance in this period is due to the relatively low success 
rate for infant firms in Europe. Table III indicates that less than 1 in 8 infant firms exited 
either via IPO or M&A, while almost twice as many mature firms had a successful exit 
via  these  two  channels.  The  outcome  is  that  successful  mature  firms  outnumber 
successful infant firms in Europe by nearly a 4-to-1 ratio; in contrast, for the U.S. the ex-
post ratio after 2000 is again close to 1. 
The above-described results are consistent with previous findings in the literature: 
seed/start-up and early stage firms in Europe largely underperform in comparison to their 
American  counterparts  (see  Murray  and  Marriott,  1998,  for  evidence  for  the  period 
between 1991 and 1997, and Raade and Dantas Machado, 2008, and Hege et al., 2009, 
for more recent evidence). In contrast, mature VC-backed firms have shown between 20 
and 30 percent probability of success both in Europe and the U.S.  
 
III.3  Comparison of Success Rates by Industry 
This section investigates whether there are significant differences in performance across 
the  six  different  industries.  Focusing  on  the  first  sub-period,  our  empirical  findings 
included in Table IV provide an industry-by-industry summary analysis for 1985-1999. 
Our  results  show  that  the  U.S.  outperforms  Europe  in  success  by  acquisition  in  all 
sectors,  and  in  success  by  IPO  (albeit  only  marginally  in  computer  hardware  and 
software; medical, health and life sciences; and communications and media). Moreover, 
the U.S. outperforms Europe in success of early-stage firms, and in success of mature 
firms. 
 
<Insert Table IV about here>    
 
Table IV also indicates that exit by acquisition had a higher rate of success than 
exit by IPO, except for VC-backed Biotech firms and, to a lesser extent, in the Medical, 
Health, and Life Sciences sector. Exit by IPO, as documented by Gompers and Lerner 
(1998), provides significantly higher returns when compared to other exit strategies. The 
observation that the Biotech sector is the “best” performer comes as no surprise - over the 
last decade, this sector has been identified as one of the thriving new industries in the 
U.S. (Gordon, 2002; Guo, Lev and Zhou, 2005). Similarly, in the case of Europe, its 
characteristics confirm that it is one of the most dynamic industries. According to Popov 
and Roosenboom (2009), as of 2005, 55% of Biotech companies in Europe were less than 
5 years old, the rate of new business incorporation was 14% on average, 44% of Biotech 
employees in Europe have been actively involved in research and development (R&D), 
and the industry spent 7.5 billion Euro on R&D in 2004 alone, becoming one of the most 
R&D intensive sectors in Europe.  
Turning  to  the  analysis  of  the  second  sub-period,  which  includes  the  years 
between 2000 and 2009, we observe quite a few important features. First, consistent with 
the  aggregate  numbers  reported  in  Table  II,  we  note  –without  exception–  a  drastic 
reduction in the percentage of both European and American VC-backed firms from all 
industries that have been taken public. In terms of mergers and acquisitions, we see a fall 
in the success rates across all industries although this reduction is not as sharp as in the 
case of IPOs.  
When specifically looking at IPOs, we observe in Table IV that the U.S. no longer 
dominates  Europe  in  all  sectors;  on  average,  the  13  European  countries  show  better 
success rates in 3 industries: Computer Hardware and Software, Semi-conductors and 
other  Electronics,  and  Communications  and  Media.  Yet,  success  via  mergers  and 
acquisitions  is  still  greater  in  the  U.S.:  American  firms  outperform  their  European 
counterparts by ratios ranging between 3-to-2 and 5-to-2 depending on the particular 
industry. Finally, whereas the U.S. continues to dominate Europe in terms of the success 
of infant firms, the gap when it comes to mature companies has sharply decreased – 
mostly due to a fall in the success rates for U.S. firms – in all industries, except for the 
Medical, Health and Life Sciences sector.    
 
IV.  Regression Analysis 
 
In the following pages, we investigate which factors are associated with successful VC 
investments by means of a multivariate probit regression analysis. We begin by providing 
a  brief discussion as to which  indicators serve as  a  good proxy  for determinants we 
expect to play a significant role in enhancing the likelihood of a successful exit by a VC-
backed firm. 
 
Venture Capital Investment by Industry Group 
First of all, it is important to distinguish between funds raised and funds invested. A VC 
fund will raise resources each year; however, it may not necessarily invest those funds in 
the same year. VC funds are actively managing current portfolio companies until the 
proper  exit time,  and  may  not  be ready  to take on a  new investment  until  a  current 
company has exited because of management availability. Likewise, the amount of money 
raised may be inaccurate as a proxy because many times they simply correspond to a 
rollover process of investment from one project to the next. To further elaborate, when a 
VC fund exits a portfolio company, investment is then returned to their original investors, 
who many times become repeat clients to the VC fund and reinvest their desired level of 
capital back into the fund, which then represents the way capital is re-utilized in a VC 
fund. Another reason why the amount of money raised may not show a logical pattern to 
actual investment is that VC funds may have not found what they consider high potential 
investments, and may decide to wait and keep the funds sitting until an opportune venture 
is found.  
In contrast, data on VC disbursements is exactly the capital given a designation 
into  a  venture  company,  and  best  represents  the  activity  of  VC  on  the  supply  side 
regarding investment level of funds. This variable is best suited to identify how much 
capital has been put into VC-backed companies in each industry and country. It is more 
interesting to see whether one industry or country is spending more or less in relative 
terms; and moreover, what type of impact has it had on the ability of each portfolio 
company to reach an exit stage.    
For our probit analysis we employ the average investment per firm (in millions of 
Euro), classified by industry and country, over the two sub-periods (1985-1999 and 2000-
2009). Since we do not have data for all firms, we compute average investment based on 
the total reported, divided by the number of firms that reported the amount of funds 
received, rather than the total number of firms. A priori, one would expect that the larger 
the  amount  of  resources  devoted  to  a  representative  firm  belonging  to  a  particular 
industry, the more likely it will be that this representative firm has a successful exit. 
 
Gross Domestic Product 
A  high  level  of  aggregate  economic  activity  might  indicate  favorable  entrepreneurial 
conditions;  as  periods  of  increased  GDP  might  indicate  that  possibilities  to 
commercialize  technological  innovations  have  increased  (Gompers  and  Lerner,  1998; 
Jeng and Wells, 2000). Given that we are using averages over time and not a year-by-
year analysis, we opt for using average GDP per capita (in thousands of Euro), for each 
of the sub-periods, and for every country of interest. We would expect in general that 
higher GDP per capita should be associated with a higher likelihood of a successful VC 
project. Since several studies that use cross-country data also control for real GDP growth 
as  a  determinant  of  VC  investment  (Jeng  and  Wells,  2000;  Gomes  Santana  Felix, 
Gulamhussen  and  Pires,  2007),  we  run  a  separate  set  of  regressions  employing  real 
growth instead of GDP per capita. The results, which are presented in Tables B and C in 
the Appendix, suggest that our main findings are robust to the use of this alternative 
measure of economic activity.  
 
Research and Development Expenditures 
VC investments are high-risk, high-reward projects, which makes them comparable with 
R&D investments. Thus, an increase in domestic expenditure on R&D would imply a 
greater supply of resources raised which are available for VC and also demand for similar 
high-tech,  high-risk  companies.  When  R&D  is  better  funded,  the  chances  of 
technological and other advanced science opportunities should increase and may dually 
lead to more VC ventures.     
In expectation, times during which investments in R&D are higher might indicate 
more  technological  or  innovative  opportunities.  Besides  the  idea  that  R&D  spending 
might capture demand effects over time, it might also capture demand effects across 
countries.  Therefore,  countries  with  higher  levels  of  R&D  spending  might  contain  a 
higher  number  of  entrepreneurs  with  potentially  fruitful  ideas.  This  effect  has  been 
described by Gompers and Lerner (1998) who show, within the U.S., that states with 
higher levels of both academic and corporate R&D spending also have higher levels of 
VC financing activity. 
Our analysis controls therefore for aggregate R&D per capita, also for both sub-
periods (1985-1999 and 2000-2009), and all countries in our sample. All other things 
equal,  a  larger  amount  of  funds  devoted  for  R&D  would  be  associated  with  higher 
technological or innovative opportunities, and therefore, higher likelihood of success of 
VC-financed projects.  
 
Regulatory Environment and Legal Variables 
Previous literature has shown that for all countries that want to increase successful VC 
investments  it  is  vital  to  remove  obstacles  that  hamper  the  growth  of  their  financial 
markets,  in  particular  their  VC  market.  For  instance,  Gompers  and  Lerner  (1998) 
examine the determinants of VC fundraising in the U.S. They study industry-aggregate, 
state-level, and firm-specific fundraising to determine if macroeconomic, regulatory, or 
performance factors affect VC activity and conclude that the regulatory environment and 
indicators of the legal system play a crucial role. Cumming and MacIntosh (2003) also 
highlight the impact of legal and institutional factors on exit strategies when comparing 
U.S.  and  Canadian  venture  financing.  In  sum,  most  previous  papers  conclude  that 
countries with a weak tradition of equity culture and limited asset mobility should ensure 
that  administrative  and  regulatory  obstacles  are  minimized  to  enable  innovative 
companies to get the VC financing and exit opportunities they need (Myers, 1999; Jaffee 
and Levonian, 2001; Ferreira and Ferreira, 2006; Kaplan, Martel and Stromberg, 2007). 
The regulatory environment and legal variables we employ in our analysis, i.e. Rule of 
Law  and  Creditor  Rights,  originate  from  La  Porta  et  al.  (1997);  while  Anti-Director 
Rights were obtained from Spamann (2010).    
 
Industry-specific variables 
Our  baseline  specification  for  the  regression  analyses  is  to  model  our  alternative 
measures of success as a linear function of average investment per firm (in millions of 
Euro); GDP per capita, and R&D per capita (both measured in thousands of Euro); and 
three legal variables as controls (Rule of Law, Anti-Director Rights, and Creditor Rights). 
We proceed with our sample of 13 European countries and across the six industries of 
interest. Given the documented differences in performance of VC-funded firms in the 
U.S. and Europe, we run the regressions with and without the U.S., to verify if the main 
results at the industry level still apply. 
We  also  add  industry-specific  dummy  variables  to  test  whether  there  are 
significant  differences  between  industries  in  regards  to  the  probability  of  success. 
Specifically, we will use the Non-high tech sector as the benchmark for comparison. This 
broad sector comprises firms of the following industries: business services, agricultural, 
forestry,  financial  services,  utilities,  manufacturing,  transportation,  construction, 
chemicals  and  materials,  pollution  and  recycling,  industrial  equipment,  oil  and  gas 
exploration, consumer products, entertainment and leisure, and food and beverage; and it 




For our multivariate specification, the nature of the data set would a priori be suitable for 
a panel data analysis. Nonetheless, this may prove counterproductive given that, for some 
countries and industries, there are only very few observations of VC funded firms and 
exits;  and  this  very  well  may  both  provide  some  unusually  high  weights  to  these 
observations and rather awkward results for years in which no exits were recorded. An 
example of this is the Biotech industry for Portugal, Italy and Austria: between 1985 and 
2005, only 4, 6, and 9 Biotech firms received VC funds, respectively; which would leave 
several years with missing information or just one data point. 
Instead, we proceed to separate the data into the two same sub-periods as in our 
descriptive analysis (before and after 2000), and estimate the model via a probit model, in    
which  we  try  to  determine  the  importance  of  each  of  the  explanatory  variables  in 
predicting  the  likelihood  of  success  of  a  VC-backed  firm.    As  a  result  of  missing 
observations – mainly with respect to the available information on average investment 
per firm – we are forced to limit our sample to analyzing exits for 33,358 (12,477 for 
1985-1999; and 20,881 from 2000 onwards). 
The results are reported as follows: In a first step, we differentiate between the 
two successful exit strategies: exit via IPO and exit via M&A. In a second step, we run 
separate probit regressions for infant and mature firms.  
 
IV.1  Explaining Success by Exit Strategy 
Table V reports the results when considering exit via IPO. For the sub-period between 
1985 and 1999, the coefficient on average investment is negative and significant, if firms 
from both the U.S. and European countries are considered. Thus we fail to find evidence 
suggesting that a higher level of VC funding to a particular industry makes firms from 
this industry more likely to successfully go public. 
 
<Insert Table V about here> 
 
  With respect to the Non high-tech sector, VC investment in Biotech, Medical, 
Health and Life Sciences (MHL), and Communications and Media (CM) has a higher 
likelihood  of  resulting  in  an  IPO.  For  Semi-conductors  and  Other  Electronics  this 
difference is not significant, while firms in the Computer sector underperform relatively 
to their Non-high tech counterparts. In particular, success rate for the biotech industry, 
controlling for all other factors, is significantly higher than the benchmark sector (with a 
coefficient of 0.3).  Regarding the other  control variables,  GDP per  capita enters  the 
regression  with  a  negative  and  significant  coefficient,  contrary  to  our  expectations; 
whereas higher levels of Rule of Law are associated with better performance of IPOs. 
Finally, neither R&D per capita, nor the other legal variables enter the regression with 
significant coefficients. 
Column 2 replicates these results, excluding the data on the U.S. from the sample. 
The impact of average investment on the likelihood of VC-backed firms going public    
becomes  insignificant,  while  biotech,  MHL,  and  CM  remain  the  most  successful 
industries. Interestingly, when considering only European VC-backed firms, GDP per 
capita becomes a positive and significant explanatory variable; while Rule of Law is no 
longer significant.  As before, none of the other control variables have any significant 
impact on exit via IPO. 
Turning to our  analysis of the period  starting 2000, displayed  in  the last  two 
columns of Table V, we can verify that average investment is positively and significantly 
correlated  with  success  via  IPO  –  both  with  and  without  U.S.  data  in  the  sample. 
However,  once  we  control  for  all  other  factors,  only  biotech  and  MHL  have  a 
significantly higher success rate compared to the non-high tech sector over this period, 
with all other industries having either a similar, or even a relatively worse performance 
(this latter case applies to both the computer and semi-conductors industries when firms 
from all countries are considered). Contrary to our expectations, GDP per capita again 
enters  the  regression  with  a  negative  sign  (albeit  it  becomes  insignificant  once  we 
exclude American VC-backed firms). The coefficient on R&D per capita is positive and 
significant (with and without U.S. data); while finally, higher scores for the legal control 
variables Rule of Law and Anti-Director Rights are associated with lower successful exits 
via IPO from 2000 onward (again, with or without American VC-backed firms in the 
sample). 
Summarizing this first set of results, the main driving factors of VC-backed firms 
going public were mainly the particular characteristics of each industry and, after 2000 
the amount of funding these firms received. The differences between the relevance of the 
determinants  of  VC  success  in  the  U.S.  and  in  European  countries  can  be  mainly 
identified by the apparent asymmetric effects of  GDP per capita, and for the period 
between 1985 and 1999, by the striking difference between the correlation of success and 
Rule of Law, when one excludes American VC-backed firms from the sample. 
Table VI displays the case of successful exit via a merger or an acquisition. For 
the period 1985-1999, reported in the first two columns, average investment appears with 
a negative and insignificant sign, suggesting that, for this particular period, the amount of 
money received by VC-backed firms did not have any impact on their likelihood of being 
acquired by or  merging with other firms, irrespective of whether or not U.S. data is    
considered in the sample. It is interesting to note that while firms from all industries 
except biotech experienced a higher probability of success than the non-high tech sector, 
none of the industries performed any differently from the benchmark once American VC-
backed firms are excluded from the sample.  GDP per capita enters the regression with a 
negative sign (albeit only significant when American ventures are in the sample); and 
R&D per capita has an insignificant effect. Finally, higher scores for Rule of Law and 
Anti-Director Rights (and lower scores of Creditor Rights) are associated with a higher 
probability of exit via M&A, but once we exclude the U.S. data from the sample only 
Anti-Director Rights remains significant. 
 
<Insert Table VI about here> 
 
The period starting the year 2000 does suggest that average investment per firm 
becomes an important variable in explaining the acquisition or merger of VC-backed 
firms, but only when American VC-backed firms are included. As for the sector specific 
variables, while all of them are positive and significant when all firms are considered, 
only firms in the computer sector and CM industry are more likely to exit via M&A than 
those in the non-high tech sector, once U.S. data are excluded. GDP per capita enters the 
regression  with  a  negative  and  significant  sign  and  R&D  per  capita  has  a  positive 
significant coefficient (with or without American ventures in our sample). As for the 
legal environment variables, higher scores of Anti-Director Rights are associated with a 
higher probability of exit via M&A. This continues to be the case when considering only 
European ventures, and in this smaller sample creditor rights also enter the regression 
with a positive and significant coefficient. 
 
IV.2  Explaining Success by Life Cycle 
In the following we also investigate whether the life cycle of the VC-backed firms might 
play  a  pivotal  role  in  the  determination  of  successful  exits.  Table  VII  presents  our 
findings of successful exits of infants firms. The first two columns report the results for 
the period 1985-1999 and only when limiting the sample to European ventures do we find 
a positive significant effect of average VC investment in the overall success of seed/start-   
up and early stage firms. The explanatory power of the likelihood of a successful exit by 
infant firms lies mainly on industry-specific characteristics: firms in all sectors perform 
better than their counterparts in the non-high tech industry, while only biotech and CM 
do so when one leaves out American ventures. GDP per capita once again enters the 
regression  with  a  negative  and  significant  coefficient,  and  the  effect  disappears  for 
European VC-backed firms. Finally, Anti-Director Rights and Rule of Law appear with 
positive coefficients (when all firms are considered); while Creditor Rights has a negative 
effect only when the U.S. data is excluded from the sample. 
 
<Insert Table VII about here> 
 
  Starting 2000, infant firms do seem to be more successful when receiving more 
funds, but this finding is not as strong if the U.S. ventures are excluded from the sample. 
All industries exhibit, on average, better performance than the benchmark, but for firms 
in the semi-conductor sector these results become insignificant when excluding American 
VC-backed  firms.  For  the  entire  sample  and  the  one  that  only  includes  European 
ventures, GDP per capita enters the regression with a negative and significant sign and 
R&D per  capita has a positive significant coefficient. Finally,  higher scores  of  Anti-
Director Rights are associated with a higher probability of exit of infant firms; while the 
coefficient of Rule of Law becomes negative and significant when excluding American 
VC-backed firms; and Creditor Rights is negative and significant only when all firms in 
the sample are considered. 
Summarizing, success for VC-backed infant firms in either sub-period is linked 
more  with  industry-specific  elements,  rather  than  with  funding  received  or  any 
macroeconomic  or  legal  variables.  For  the  period  beginning  2000,  research  and 
development plays a more important role. Excluding American ventures from our sample 
affects some of the findings, confirming our previous observation that, when dealing with 
success at the seed/start-up and early stage levels, the U.S. and the European countries 
have quite different characteristics. 
Table VIII presents the results on linking the success of established VC-backed 
firms  to  its  determinants.  For  the  period  comprising  1985-1999,  higher  average    
investment  is  counter-intuitively  associated  with  a  lower  likelihood  of  success.  The 
industry-specific dummies point to better performance of all industries with respect to the 
non-high  tech  sector,  with  the  sole  exception  of  European  ventures  in  the  computer 
industry. Finally, the country-specific controls and legal variables only seem relevant 
when American VC-backed firms are included in the sample. 
 
<Insert Table VIII about here> 
 
The period after 2000 does suggest some evidence as to a positive impact of 
average investment on a successful exit by VC-backed mature firms; while all industries 
perform better than the non-high tech sector. Here, R&D per capita enters the regression 
with a positive and significant sign while GDP per capita appears with a negative and 
significant coefficient. The aforementioned results are robust to excluding the U.S. data. 
Only for the legal control variables do we see changes between the specification that 
includes all VC-backed firms and the one that only considers European ventures. 
Our general findings are also similar when employing GDP growth instead of 
GDP per capita as a control variable. These additional probit results are available in the 
Appendix: Table A (for IPO versus M&A exit) and Table B (for infant versus mature 
firms). 
 
IV.3  General Discussion 
In sum, we have observed that higher levels of average investment are linked to better 
performance by VC-backed firms going public, when considering the period after 2000. 
This  does  not  come  as a  big  surprise.  Campbell  and  Kraeussl  (2007) conclude  “size 
matters” for the success of the VC industry in Central and Eastern Europe. Numerous 
public  policy  research  groups  have  also  confirmed  the  crucial  role  of  sufficient  VC 
financing.  For  instance,  the  Conference  Board  of  Canada  frequently  asserts  that  the 
investment amounts per deal for VC in Canada are too low to generate any meaningful 
success (see, e.g., the latest report by the Conference Board of Canada (2009) on the 
Western provinces.    
The  level  of  average  investment  also  is  a  robust  variable  in  explaining  better 
performance of mergers and acquisitions and the overall success of mature firms, albeit 
again only after 2000. We have also seen that industry-specific characteristics tend to 
explain differences in success mainly over the first period, when looking at success via 
IPO and success of infant firms. Overall, when compared to the benchmark of non-high 
tech  firms,  we  find  evidence  that  VC-backed  firms  in  the  Medical,  Health  and  Life 
Sciences; and the biotech industry tend to have a preferred exit via IPO; while computer 
software and hardware as well as semi-conductors and other electronics tend to be more 
prone to exit via an acquisition or merger. For the communications and media sector, 
both types of exits are usually more likely than for the non-high tech sector, depending on 
the period analyzed (exits via IPO between 1985 and 1999, and exists via M&A after 
2000). 
As for the decomposition stages of VC financing, most of what we can observe is 
that success by infant firms on the non-high tech sector was significantly lower than for 
any of the other industries between 1985 and 1999, although some of these sector specific 
differences have gotten much narrower since the year 2000. Interestingly, neither the 
country-specific macroeconomic variables (GDP per capita and R&D per capita), nor the 
legal variables (Rule of Law, Anti-Director Rights, and Creditor Rights) have a robust 
significant effect on the likelihood of exit across both sub-periods. While this does not 
necessarily  rule  out  country-specific  characteristics  as  explanatory  variables,  it  does 
reiterate  the  importance  of  amount  of  funding  and  industry-specific characteristics  in 
determining which paths will be more likely conducive to successful exits of VC-backed 
firms. 
We can conclude that while we have indeed observed a better performance in the 
U.S. vis-à-vis Europe before the end of the 1990s, most of it has been a result of the 
American infant firms performing better than their European counterparts. After 2000, 
the gap has closed, but mostly due to a sharp reduction in the percentage of American 
VC-backed firms that have successfully gone public. The gap with respect to infant firms 
has  however  not  narrowed:  European  countries  are  still  experiencing  a  great  deal  of 
trouble  in  making  seed/start-up  and  early  stage  firms  into  successful  ventures, 
irrespective of the type of industry they belong to.    
 
V  Conclusion 
 
Previous research has concluded that the success of VC-backed firms depends on a large 
number  of  factors,  many  of  which  are  quite  specific.  The  contribution  of  this  paper 
consists of explaining the difference in success documented in the literature between U.S. 
and  European  VC  financing.  It  has  been  suggested  that,  although  the  European  VC 
industry has undergone substantial development and growth over the past two decades, a 
distinct  gap  in  performance  still  exists.  By  looking  at  specific  factors  that  include  a 
venture‟s  industry  and  financing  stage  (which  we  argue  may  also  determine  in  part 
venture  capitalists‟  success  in  exiting  their  investments),  we  attempt  to  explain  this 
performance gap. 
Indeed,  our  findings  show  that  differences  in  the  rates  of  success  and  thus 
performance  are  only  partly  due  to  the  intrinsic  differences  between  the  U.S.  and 
European  VC  experiences.  We  find  that  industry-specific  characteristics  play  an 
important role – in particular, our results suggest that the relatively higher success rate 
found  in  VC-backed  biotech  firms,  for  instance,  may  be  mostly  due  to  the  intrinsic 
dynamic nature of this sector, and less to where the firms are located and where the funds 
come from. 
We  were  also  interested  in  analyzing  whether  substantial  differences  across 
industries and countries arise when looking separately at the success‟ rate of firms that 
have received VC at the seed/start-up and early stage versus firms that received funding 
at later stages.  We also observe – confirming the findings of previous studies  – that 
differences  in  the  stage  at  which  firms  received  VC  funding  tends  to  be  a  crucial 
determinant of success – mainly for European countries. 
Our results suggest that, inasmuch as some of the differences in performance can 
be explained by country-specific factors (in particular, when considering seed/start-up 
and early stage firms), there are also important idiosyncratic differences across industries. 
For instance, firms in the biotech and the medical, health and life science sectors tend to 
be significantly more likely to have a successful exit via IPO, while firms in the computer 
industry as well as in the communications and media sector are more prone to exit via    
merger  or  acquisition.  Important  differences  across  industries  also  emerge  when 
considering infant versus mature firms, and their preferred exit. 
Finally, we recognize that this constitutes only a first step towards explaining 
differences in rates of VC success and types of exits. Other factors, such as the degree of 
experience of venture capitalists (Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Lu, 2007; Gompers et al., 
2008;  Hartmann-Wendels,  Keienburg  and  Sievers,  2010),  and  other  industry-specific 
characteristics, need to be controlled for to draw more definite conclusions. Moreover, 
the performance gap might also (partly) be explained by a potential lack of valuable 
projects in Europe. For instance, the most recent Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (2009) 
indicates such a shortage rather than that investors in Europe do not provide as much 
value adding. Unfortunately, the variables required to control for this phenomenon are 
just available from 2004 onwards, which would render any comparison between sub-
periods  useless.  Nonetheless,  these  and  other  extensions  are  in  our  sights  for  future 
research.  
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Table I: Distribution of Firms receiving VC Funding - by Country and by Industry 
Note: This table summarizes the data of all firms receiving venture capital financing between 1985 and 2005. Firms are classified by country and industry; and 
also by whether they received the first round of funding as a seed and start-up, early-stage, or mature stage firm. 
 
Country  Total  Seed and 
Start-up  
Early 




















Austria  222  32  27  163  52  14  9  118  10  19 
Belgium  390  73  65  252  113  17  24  184  23  29 
Denmark  410  119  61  230  100  28  46  153  43  40 
Finland  698  219  121  358  171  49  22  328  48  80 
France  2,788  308  402  2,078  670  135  94  1,568  137  184 
Germany  1,721  297  291  1,133  516  113  163  627  99  203 
Ireland  310  65  74  171  120  20  13  98  18  41 
Italy  527  45  44  438  69  18  6  369  17  48 
Netherlands  731  74  81  576  155  24  29  424  32  67 
Portugal  250  72  14  164  22  8  4  191  14  11 
Spain  670  70  35  565  102  10  13  463  34  48 
Sweden  831  170  129  532  197  41  44  364  80  105 
United Kingdom  4,135  433  562  3,140  954  162  145  2,252  298  324 
United States  27,583  5,233  8,543  13,807  8,915  1,591  1,188  9,518  2,591  3,780 
EU-13  13,683  1,977  1,906  9,800  3,241  639  612  7,139  853  1,199 
All countries  41,266  7,210  10,449  23,607  12,156  2,230  1,800  16,657  3,444  4,979    
Table II. U.S. Versus EU-13: VC Funding and Success by IPO and by M&A 
Notes: Success by IPO is computed as the number of firms venture capitalists successfully exited by initial 
public  offering  divided  by  the  total  number  of  firms  receiving  VC  funding.  Success  by  Merger  or 
Acquisition is computed as the number of firms venture capitalists successfully exited by merging with or 
being acquired by other firms, divided by the total number of firms receiving VC. Leveraged Buyouts, 
includes the cases in which the company or a controlling interest of it were bought out by the owners 
through  other  means  of  funding.  For  all  three  measures,  the  rates  were  computed  considering  all 
transactions between 1985 and 1999; and between 2000 and 2009 (with companies receiving VC-funding 
through 2005), by industry and country, and were multiplied by a factor of 100. 
 












EU-13  3,605  14.67  19.53  17.15 
U.S.  16,678  21.98  29.43  1.84 
2000-2009 
EU-13  10,078  6.53  10.42  16.31 
U.S.  10,905  6.28  21.71  5.37    
Table III. U.S. Versus EU-13: VC Funding and Success by Infant and Mature Firms 
Notes: Success by Infant Firms is computed as the number of seed/start-up and early-stage firms venture 
capitalists successfully exited by going public or through merger and acquisition, divided by the total 
number of seed/start-up and early-stage firms, which received VC funding. Success by Mature Firms is 
computed as the number of established or later stage firms venture capitalists successfully exited by going 
public or through merger and acquisition, divided by the total number of established firms, which received 
VC. For both measures, the rates were computed considering all transactions between 1985 and 1999; and 
between 2000 and 2009 (with companies receiving VC funding through 2005), by industry and country, 
and were multiplied by a factor of 100. 
 
   
Ex-ante ratio 
(mature firms 
to infant firms) 
Success by 





to infant firms) 
1985-1999 
EU-13  3.27  38.51  33.29  2.83 
U.S.  1.15  50.55  52.15  1.18 
2000-2009 
EU-13  2.32  11.68  19.22  3.81 
U.S.  0.81  26.46  29.88  0.92 
    
Table IV. U.S. Versus EU-13: Success by Industry 
Notes: Success by IPO and Success by Acquisition or Merger are computed as the number of firms venture capitalists successfully exited via IPO and through 
merger or acquisition respectively, divided by the total number of firms receiving VC funding. Success by Infant Firms is computed as the number of seed/start-
up and early-stage firms that experienced overall success, divided by the total number of seed/start-up and early-stage firms, which received VC. Success by 
Mature Firms is computed as the number of established firms that experienced overall success, divided by the total number of established firms, which received 
VC. For all measures, the rates were computed considering all transactions between 1985-1999, and 2000-2009 (with companies receiving VC funding through 
2005), by industry and country, and were multiplied by a factor of 100. 
 
    1985-1999  2000-2009 






















Computer Hardware and Software  EU-13  16.20  20.98  36.25  38.34    5.95  11.86  12.36  22.66 
U.S.  18.39  35.56  51.33  58.64    2.69  27.99  29.55  33.23 
Semi-conductors and Other Electronics  EU-13  15.82  22.78  32.65  42.20    7.07  10.40  10.83  24.07 
U.S.  25.49  32.40  58.06  57.66    4.82  23.21  24.95  35.98 
Biotechnology  EU-13  26.88  15.00  49.51  28.07    9.01    9.45  13.97  28.57 
U.S.  39.44  23.78  60.41  74.63  11.15  15.26  22.14  39.37 
Medical, Health and Life Sciences  EU-13  26.85  19.44  43.02  48.46    8.48  10.36  11.16  23.83 
U.S.  28.49  27.84  53.30  60.86    9.57  16.69  20.93  35.00 
Communications and Media 
EU-13  20.45  20.82  48.60  37.04    6.24  14.73  15.14  25.43 
U.S.  21.14  33.16  53.41  55.36    4.44  25.38  28.01  33.98 
Non-High Technology / Other  EU-13  11.06  18.91  29.12  30.37    6.35    9.02    7.76  16.50 
U.S.  20.98  24.08  37.97  47.05  10.46  13.93  18.92  25.77    
Table V. Success 1: Exit via IPO 
Notes: Successful Exit via IPO takes the value of ‘1’ if a firm successfully exited by going public, and ‘0’ 
otherwise. Average investment per firm is measured in millions of Euro. GDP per capita and R&D per 
capita are measured in thousands of Euro. All legal variables (Rule of Law, Anti-Director Rights, and 
Creditor Rights) originate from La Porta et al. (1997) and Spamann (2010). The analysis is conducted for 
the two sub-periods (1985-1999 and 2000-2009; with companies receiving VC funding through 2005), 
controlling for results with and without data for the U.S. Standard errors are in parentheses; asterisks ***, 
**, and * determine significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  1985-1999      
(all countries) 
1985-1999      
(excl. U.S.) 
2000-2009         
(all countries) 
2000-2009      
(excl. U.S.) 






























































































         
Likelihood Ratio  243.66***  51.32***  182.40***  37.55*** 
Number of Observations  12,477  2,821  20,881  9,976    
Table VI. Success 2: Exit via Merger or Acquisition 
Notes: Successful Exit via Merger or Acquisition takes the value of ‘1’ if a firm successfully exited by 
merging with or being acquired by other firms, and ‘0’ otherwise. Average investment per firm is measured 
in millions of Euro. GDP per capita and R&D per capita are measured in thousands of Euro. All legal 
variables (Rule of Law, Anti-Director Rights, and Creditor Rights) originate from La Porta et al. (1997) and 
Spamann  (2010).  The  analysis  is  conducted  for  the  two  sub-periods  (1985-1999  and  2000-2009;  with 
companies receiving VC funding through 2005), controlling for results with and without data for the U.S. 
Standard errors are in parentheses; asterisks ***, **, and * determine significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
  1985-1999      
(all countries) 
1985-1999      
(excl. U.S.) 
2000-2009         
(all countries) 
2000-2009      
(excl. U.S.) 






























































































         
Likelihood Ratio  314.24***  16.54  766.89***  179.20*** 
Number of Observations  12,477  2,821  20,881  9,976 
    
Table VII. Successful Exit of Infant Firms 
Notes:  Successful  Exit  of  Infant  Firms  takes  the  value  of  ‘1’  if  a  seed,  start-up,  and  early-stage  firm 
experienced overall success, and „0’ otherwise. Average investment per firm is measured in millions of 
Euro. GDP per capita and R&D per capita are measured in thousands of Euro. All legal variables (Rule of 
Law, Anti-Director Rights, and Creditor Rights) originate from La Porta et al. (1997) and Spamann (2010). 
The analysis is conducted for the two sub-periods (1985-1999 and 2000-2009; with companies receiving 
VC funding through 2005), controlling for results with and without data for the U.S. Standard errors are in 
parentheses; asterisks ***, **, and * determine significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  1985-1999      
(all countries) 
1985-1999      
(excl. U.S.) 
2000-2009         
(all countries) 
2000-2009      
(excl. U.S.) 






























































































         
Likelihood Ratio  228.64***  19.96**  341.46***  67.38*** 
Number of Observations  5,479  648  9,017  3,005    
Table VIII. Successful Exit of Mature Firms 
Notes: Successful Exit by Mature Firms takes the value of ‘1’ if a mature firm experienced overall success, 
and ‘0’ otherwise. Average investment per firm is measured in millions of Euro. GDP per capita and R&D 
per capita are measured in thousands of Euro. All legal variables (Rule of Law, Anti-Director Rights, and 
Creditor Rights) originate from La Porta et al. (1997) and Spamann (2010). The analysis is conducted for 
the two sub-periods (1985-1999 and 2000-2009; with companies receiving VC funding through 2005), 
controlling for results with and without data for the U.S. Standard errors are in parentheses; asterisks ***, 
**, and * determine significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  1985-1999      
(all countries) 
1985-1999      
(excl. U.S.) 
2000-2009         
(all countries) 
2000-2009      
(excl. U.S.) 






























































































         
Likelihood Ratio  323.55***  40.15***  338.23***  153.60*** 
Number of Observations  6,998  2,173  11,864  6,971 
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Table A. Success by Exit via IPO and M&A, controlling by GDP growth 
Notes: Success by IPO and Success by M&A take the value of „1’ if a firm successfully exited by going 
public, or by merging with or being acquired by other firms, respectively, and  „0’ otherwise. Average 
investment per firm is measured in millions of Euro. Real GDP growth takes the average growth rate over 
each sub-period multiplied by a factor of 100, while R&D per capita is measured in thousands of Euro. All 
legal variables (Rule of Law, Anti-Director Rights, and Creditor Rights) originate from La Porta et al. 
(1997) and Spamann (2010). The analysis is conducted for the two sub-periods (1985-1999 and 2000-2009; 
with companies receiving VC funding through 2005). Standard errors are in parentheses; asterisks ***, **, 
and * determine significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
1985-1999      
(IPO – all 
countries) 
1985-1999      
(M&A – all 
countries) 
2000-2009         
(IPO – all 
countries) 
2000-2009      
(M&A – all 
countries) 






























































































         
Likelihood Ratio  270.74***  310.01***  178.86***  658.62*** 
Number of Observations  12,477  12,477  20,881  20,881 
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Table B. Success by Stage of Funding, controlling by GDP growth 
Notes: Success by Infant Firms and Success by Mature Firms take the value of „1’ if a seed, start-up, and 
early-stage  firm  (mature  firm,  respectively),  experienced  overall  success,  and  „0’  otherwise.  Average 
investment per firm is measured in millions of Euro.  Real GDP growth takes the average growth rate over 
each sub-period multiplied by a factor of 100, while R&D per capita is measured in thousands of Euro. All 
legal variables (Rule of Law, Anti-Director Rights, and Creditor Rights) originate from La Porta et al. 
(1997) and Spamann (2010). The analysis is conducted for the two sub-periods (1985-1999 and 2000-2009; 
with companies receiving VC funding through 2005). Standard errors are in parentheses; asterisks ***, **, 
and * determine significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 




1985-1999      
(Mature 
Firms – all 
countries) 
2000-2009         
(Infant Firms -
all countries) 
2000-2009      
(Mature Firms 
– all countries) 






























































































         
Likelihood Ratio  216.24***  325.08***  285.22***  263.83*** 
Number of Observations  5,479  6,998  9,017  11,864 
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